![]() ![]() One should always update their system repository before installing any new package, which will help you to get the latest version of applications.įor other Linux flavours you can follow this guide to install Snap store on Ubuntu, Arch, Manjaro, CentOS, Fedora.īefore going further, it is best to restart your system to ensure snap paths are updated correctly at their corresponding locations. ![]() After that, we can install Authy from the Snap store to protect our accounts with two-factor authentication.Ī Ubuntu user can skip this because Snap is preinstalled, but for distributions like Debian, you need to run the following command: $ sudo apt update & apt upgrade -yĪnd if you don’t want to install Authy from Snap, go to this section. The first and most important step is to install Snap on your Linux distributions. Installation of Authy in Ubuntu using Snap Installation of Authy without using Snap.So, the desktop 2FA option is a valid one, depending on your threat analysis.As I said above, Authy is only available in the Snap Store, but I’ll show you another method that does not require you to use the snap command to install Authy. And that's why being mindful of our threat assessments and reviewing them from time to time is very important. The ultimate question becomes: what is the most likely vector of password compromise? And that question changes constantly. If we assume that one is more likely to get our passwords from the services we use (instead of our desktops), or even that one can get passwords from our mobile devices, then the desktop security measure legitimately adds a useful security function. If one can get your password, then one can get your 2FA code.īut, a desktop 2FA option is not useless if we change our assumptions. Since your threat analysis is desktop-based, then yes, your conclusion is correct that adding a security function to the already-assumed-to-be-compromised desktop does not add a layer of security. If that is your threat analysis, that's perfectly fine, just don't forget that you have made this differentiation. You made an assumption that affects your outcome, and you cannot forget that you are making this assumption: that one "likely" gets your password via the desktop computer (i.e. ![]() IOS, is comparatively the most closed ecosystem where unlike on Android most access are not opened in API and the app checking is more thorough. Smartphones have a more restrictive ecosystem and a shorter livespan, thus a lighter probability to be infected. Writing this I am understanding that this is based on the perception that:Ĭomputer integrity < Phone integrity < iOS integrityĬomputer are more likely to be corrupted through the pile of junk I am installing on it and their more important "openness" to system changes. But I can likely picture that someone able to setup a keylogger could steal enough information to reuse any 2FA system available on my desktop computer. In my understanding, an attacker would need to intercept my password (likely through a keylogger on my desktop machine were I log most) and an access to my phone, or to the key stored on my phone. Though I am not sure about adding a desktop 2FA utility. I am quite confident, especially when used on iOS (which has a better system level app segregation), that this gives a pretty good security. Basically 2FA relies on the idea that instead of just something you know, using a service also requires something you own. ![]()
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